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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis looks at the factors that affected individual turnout and vote choice in the 
2004 U.S. presidential election. Regarding the outcome of the election, a point of dispute among 
scholars pertains to whether evangelical Christians played a meaningful role in helping re-elect 
then-President Bush to a second term in 2004. The gay-marriage issue played a prominent role in 
the presidential campaign, due in part to a ruling the Massachusetts Supreme Court rendered in 
November 2003 that legalized the marrying of same-sex couples within the state’s borders. The 
Court’s decision had a reverberating effect, particularly among evangelicals, and subsequently, it 
affected the presidential campaign as well.  
 Christian conservatives were successful in organizing efforts to get initiatives and 
referenda designed to constitutionally ban recognition of same-sex marriages on the ballot in 11 
states, all of which passed easily in November. Using a large and previously untapped dataset, I 
develop a research design that builds on work by Campbell and Monson (2008), which shows 
that evangelicals who lived in a state with a marriage amendment on the ballot in November had 
a higher level of mobilization for Bush than other evangelicals.  
 Contrary to those findings, I find that the marriage amendments in 2004 had no 
substantive impact on turnout or vote choice. Moreover, evangelicals living in marriage states 
were not more likely to turn out or vote for Bush in 2004, controlling for other relevant 
characteristics of the voters. Factors that influenced turnout in the 2004 election include: party 
identification strength, education, income, age, gender, region, and residence in a battleground 
state. Party identification, ideology, and race were predictors of vote choice in the 2004 election.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On November 2, 2004 then-U.S. President George W. Bush was re-elected to a second 
term in the White House by a narrow 2.4 percentage points and 35-electoral vote margin (286-
251)1, after defeating Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry. The former number was the smallest 
margin of victory for any incumbent president in American history (Altschuler and Spitzer 
2007), and the latter was the fourth closest electoral vote margin for a presidential contest since 
1868 (Campbell 2004). In the immediate aftermath of the election, many media pundits and 
commentators, perhaps looking for an explanation to satisfy the close result, arrived at the 
conclusion that the former president’s victory was largely driven by the support of (moral) values 
voters.  
 This conclusion was probably at least partly derived from the national exit poll presented 
on election night, which showed that “moral values” was the top determinant of vote choice 
among the electorate in terms of deciding how it cast its vote for president2. This thesis examines 
more closely the role the hot-button issue of the 2004 campaign—gay-marriage—played in 
deciding the outcome of the election, including how ballot propositions related to the issue 
affected voter turnout and presidential vote choice among evangelical Christians. 
 A November 2003 decision the Massachusetts Supreme Court rendered that legalized 
gay-marriage within the state’s borders proved to be a lightning rod in the 2004 presidential 
campaign. Following the decision, Christian conservatives got behind efforts to place initiatives 
on state ballots that were designed to constitutionally ban gay-marriage. Each of the marriage 
amendments passed in November 2004, and some have suggested that the president benefitted—
in terms of both increased turnout and vote share—from the presence of these amendments on 
                                                 
1
 The actions of one “faithless” elector in Minnesota ultimately prevented Kerry from winning the 252 electoral 
votes it initially looked like he would win on election night. 
2
 Roper Public Opinion Research Data (2004) 
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state ballots. This is notable, as scholars have usually found that initiatives in the context of a 
presidential election have no aggregate effect on turnout (Donovan et al. 2009, Grummel 2008, 
Smith 2001, Everson 1981).  
 The contradictory findings scholars have produced regarding how the amendments 
affected the outcome of the 2004 election present an opportunity to re-examine whether a certain 
facet of the presidential campaign (direct democracy) was able to stimulate turnout among a 
targeted subgroup of the larger electorate—and if it may have also affected vote choice.    
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Republican Strategy 
Rather than focusing on winning over undecided swing voters, in 2004, Republican 
operatives devised a “base-mobilization” strategy to get Bush re-elected. According to one of the 
president’s chief strategists—Ken Mehlman—this two-pronged strategy consisted of 1) 
emphasizing the need for strong leadership to counter the threat of terrorism, and 2) mobilizing 
millions of evangelical Christians and other culturally conservative voters upset about gay-
marriage, abortion, and other threats to traditional values as well (Abramowitz 2004). More 
specifically, Karl Rove set a goal for the second part of the strategy that aimed to turn out an 
additional four million evangelicals nationwide (Green 2006).  
 At first glance, Rove’s stated goal appears to have been met with success—exit polls 
suggest that 22 million evangelicals turned out in 2004, up from 15 million in 2000 (McMahon 
2005). Nationally, turnout in 2004 was 60 percent—the highest it had been since 1968 
(Altschuler and Spitzer 2007)—and up in every state from 2000 (McDonald 2004); however, 
scholars are not in complete agreement that a systematic increase in turnout occurred among 
evangelicals, social conservatives more broadly, or even that Republicans had a better turnout 
model than the one Democrats devised. Renowned political scientist Alan Abramowitz, for 
instance, has stated that there is no indication that the election outcome reflected a brilliantly 
executed campaign by the Republicans or a flawed campaign by the Democrats (Abramowitz 
2004). Similarly, Harvard Professor of Government Barry Burden has claimed that not much 
evidence exists that social conservatives turned out disproportionately in 2004 (Burden 2004). In 
this thesis, one dispute I attempt to resolve relates to how turnout among evangelical/born-again 
Christians was affected as a function of ballot initiatives and referenda that were presented to 
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voters in 11 states in November—all of which were designed to constitutionally ban gay-
marriage within the respective states’ borders. 
 Additionally, another disputed claim about the 2004 election revolves around how said 
ballot measures affected presidential vote choice. There is a stronger consensus in the scholarly 
literature that the measures increased support for Bush than there is that they increased turnout. 
Nevertheless, more than a few scholars have claimed that the ballot measures neither increased 
turnout (Abramowitz 2004, Burden 2004, Karol and Miguel 2007, Smith et al. 2006), nor had 
any tangible effect on presidential vote choice (Abramowitz 2004, Hillygus and Shields 2005). 
In addition to testing for the effect of (gay-)marriage states on intention to vote, I also test for a 
possible effect presence of the initiatives may have had on presidential vote choice. A large and 
untapped dataset consisting of answers from telephone interviews more than 80,000 respondents 
provided the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) both pre- and post-election 2004 is the 
main source of data used in this thesis3. 
 But first, how did the gay-marriage issue impact the 2004 campaign, and who exactly are 
the values voters who some have claimed put Bush over the top in his re-election bid?  
Values Voters 
 A casual observer of the 2004 election could probably be excused for conflating values 
voters and evangelical Christians. In 2004, approximately 23 percent of the electorate identified 
themselves as born-again or evangelical Christians; and, Bush won approximately 78 percent of 
these voters (McMahon 2005)—a near mirror image of the national exit poll shown below, 
which had the president winning 80 percent of the electorate (22 percent overall) who identified 
                                                 
3
 The largest number of observations associated with a statistical model in this thesis contains slightly less than 
20,000 observations, as not every individual who was interviewed answered each of the questions in the survey. In 
terms of the relevant questions associated with the variables used in this thesis, the highest number of observations 
for one of the dependent variables is approximately 32,000 observations. 
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moral values as the top issue that determined presidential vote choice4. Gay-marriage is said to 
be one of the issues that was “lurking” behind exit polls such as this one (Olson et al. 2006).  
FIGURE 1. NATIONAL EXIT POLL (2004) 
Issues Total Kerry Bush 
Taxes 5 43 57 
Education 4 73 26 
Iraq 15 73 26 
Terrorism 19 14 86 
Economy/Jobs 20 80 18 
Moral values 22 18 80 
Health care 8 77 23 
          
 Thus, values voters essentially became synonymous with the Christian Right in dialogue 
on the 2004 presidential election. Prominent Christian Right activists have offered definitions 
describing the characteristics of values voters and the objectives they hope to achieve in electoral 
politics. Former head of Focus on the Family James Dobson, for instance, has said that a values 
voter is “someone with a Christian worldview who begins with the assumption that God is—that 
he not only exists, but he is definer of right and wrong, and there are some things that are moral 
and some things that are immoral, some things that are evil, and some things that are good” 
(Denton Jr. 2005).  
 Former Executive Director of the Christian Coalition Ralph Reed has said that “values 
voters in the South and the Heartland are concerned about preserving marriage, protecting 
children from violent or sexually explicit entertainment, teaching the same values in school that 
are taught at home, and reducing the number of teen pregnancies and abortion. More than any 
single issue, they seek to redress a coarsening of the culture and a loss of civility” (2005).  
                                                 
4
 Roper Public Opinion Research Data (2004) 
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 Getting more at the demographic and political characteristics of these voters, Christian 
Right activists have generally been found to be traditional evangelical Protestants, 
fundamentalists, Pentecostals, charismatics, and “plain-vanilla” evangelicals (Green 2006). 
Additionally, they have usually been found to be conservative and Republican in affiliation, with 
a very strong emphasis on moral issues, especially abortion and school prayer (2006). In the 
2004 election, moral values voters likely concentrated on abortion, school prayer, and gay-
marriage when in the voting booth (McMahon 2005).  
 Former President of the Family Research Council Ken Connor has said that the two 
issues that are non-negotiable for the base are: “the sanctity of life and the sanctity of marriage” 
(2005). In 2004, three-fifths of Christian Right activists named abortion and same-sex marriage 
as the most important problem facing the country, with foreign policy concerns coming in a 
distant second (Green 2006).  
 It’s important to note that not all “values voters” are affiliated with the Christian Right. In 
2004, for some voters, values also consisted of concerns related to the morality of preemptive 
war, social justice, poverty, and civil rights, just to name a few (Denton Jr. 2005). But in 2004, 
the concerns of these voters appear to have been outweighed in importance by an issue of 
morality that eventually came to the fore of the presidential campaign—gay-marriage. And, for 
Democrats, as the 2004 campaign progressed, discussions of moral values, religion, and faith 
became a distraction and a liability for Democratic standard-bearer Sen. John Kerry (2005).  
Gay-Marriage in 2004 Presidential Campaign 
 In retrospect, one key moment of the 2004 presidential campaign came in November of 
2003, when by a one-vote majority, the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized the marrying of 
same-sex couples within the state’s borders. This ruling is said to have ignited a renewed culture 
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war in courts across the country (McMahon 2005); and, indeed the decision had noticeable 
effects on the Christian Right, and subsequently, the presidential campaign as well.  
 One thing the same-sex marriage issue did in 2004 was rearrange the issue agenda of the 
Christian Right such that this particular issue received higher priority than did any other existing 
one (Wilcox 2006). The specter of gay-marriage is also said to have helped generate new state 
organizations devoted to the Christian Right, not to mention invigorate existing ones (2006). 
Perhaps more pertinent to the 2004 election, though, the same-sex marriage issue also helped 
create interracial coalitions that had not previously existed (2006). In Michigan, for example, the 
issue was so powerful that it helped cement an unusual alliance between white evangelicals, 
African-American Protestants, and Roman Catholics throughout the state (Penning 2006).  
 The issue resonated in American church congregations as well, especially in white, 
southern evangelical churches. These places became an organizing machine for Republicans in 
the same way that labor unions had functioned for Democrats in previous elections (Denton Jr. 
2005). The same-sex marriage issue also stimulated electoral activity in pastors and 
congregations that had previously been inactive (Wilcox 2006). Many pastors who had 
previously avoided talking about elections from the pulpit did so in 2004 (2006). In fact, 
politicking in the 2004 election became so intense that the IRS sent letters to both political 
parties reminding them that churches engaging in partisan activities were in danger of losing 
their tax-exempt status (Denton Jr. 2005).  
 The gay-marriage issue not only transformed the Christian Right in 2004, however. It 
also had a large indirect effect on the presidential campaign as well. In addition to the 
Massachusetts Court’s decision, the open defiance of marriage laws across the country—by 
elected officials, like former San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, for example—led President 
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Bush to announce his support for a U.S. constitutional amendment defining marriage as the 
union between one man and one woman (McMahon 2005). This is noteworthy, as the president’s 
previous stance was one that had him opposed to gay-marriage, but also to a Constitutional 
amendment forbidding it, which was—poll after poll in 2004 showed—the median position of 
the general electorate as well. But Republican strategists were leery of the change in public 
support of gay rights over the previous two decades, and thus were reluctant to embrace the 
national amendment that Christian groups and the president now opposed (Wilcox 2006).  
 Instead of an amendment to the Constitution, then, the battle over gay-marriage was 
taken to the states. The Massachusetts decision helped lead to the establishment of a “judicial 
activism” frame, which led to a push to amend state constitutions to preclude “activist, liberal 
judges” from “discovering” a right to same-sex marriage in state constitutions (2006). The gay-
marriage issue became the catchall for concerns about activist courts, banning school prayer, 
attempts to remove “under God” from the Pledge of Allegiance, and limiting religious displays 
in public (Denton Jr. 2005).  
 By November of 2004, initiatives or referenda designed to constitutionally ban gay-
marriage appeared on the ballot in 11 states—Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah (Karol and Miguel 
2007). Marriage referenda also appeared on the ballot in two primary states prior to November—
Louisiana and Missouri. In all, each ballot measure passed easily, garnering 70 percent support 
on average (Donovan et al. 2008)5.  
                                                 
5
 Percentages marriage referenda and initiatives passed with in 2004: Referendum states: Mississippi (86 percent), 
Louisiana (78 percent), Georgia (76 percent), Oklahoma (76 percent), Kentucky (75 percent), Missouri (71 percent), 
and Utah (66 percent).  Initiative states: Arkansas (75 percent), North Dakota (73 percent), Montana (67 percent), 
Ohio (62 percent), Oregon (57 percent), and Michigan (56 percent).  
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 The large margins the amendments passed with may have caused observers of the 2004 
election to conclude that a “spillover” effect resulted from these marriage contests, and that Bush 
may have been the beneficiary of the presence of these propositions on the ballot. A more 
skeptical observer, however, may argue that the true intent of these measures was not to actually 
ban gay-marriage in the first place, but ultimately to drive up support for Bush.  
 Proponents of the marriage initiatives have disputed this assertion, however. Phil Burress, 
president of the Citizens for Community Values in Ohio, has said that the timing of the initiatives 
was dictated by the Massachusetts’ Court’s decision on marriage (Vlahos 2004): “This is all 
about marriage for us. If it helps Bush, so be it” (2004). Burress did not deny that Christian 
conservative groups were behind the amendment efforts, however. “It’s (the church,) people of 
faith that have been behind this for years,” he said (2004).  
 State chairwoman of the Georgia Christian Coalition Sadie Fields remarked that the 
presidential contest was not taken into consideration when devising the initiative in Georgia. “If 
that’s a byproduct, then so be it. What we are fighting is the radical homosexual agenda,” she 
said (Brownfield 2004).  
 Prior to the election, initiative and referendum scholar John Matsusaka said that the 
initiatives would most likely help Bush and other Republican candidates the most, given that 
Christian conservatives were the ones behind the initiative efforts in 2004 (Vlahos 2004).  
 How these ballot measures influenced the likelihood of voting among evangelical 
Christians and how they affected presidential vote choice is disputed among scholars, and 
represent the two main questions this thesis seeks to answer. 
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Voter Turnout in 2004 
Nationally, turnout was 60 percent in November 2004 (McDonald 2004), up six points 
from the 2000 election, and the highest it had been since 1968 (Altschuler and Spitzer 2007). But 
how did the half of the Republicans’ base-mobilization strategy that emphasized increasing 
turnout among evangelical Christians fare? Academic studies have shown that the mobilization 
of evangelicals is maximized when issues such as abortion, gay rights, and school prayer are 
either on the ballot, or are major components of a political campaign (Smith et al. 2006). 
Findings from the scholarly literature suggest, though, that the higher number of evangelicals 
that turned out in 2004 may have simply been the result of a natural increase among a single 
demographic group from one four-year election cycle to the next. Comparisons of exit polls, for 
example, show that evangelicals constituted 23 percent of the electorate in both the 2000 and 
2004 elections (Keeter 2005).  
 But even without an increase in the proportion of the electorate that this demographic 
comprised, there still would have been an increase in voter turnout in terms of raw numbers, 
given natural growth within the group. The concern of this thesis is how the ballot measures 
influenced voting intention among this bloc. Were evangelicals/born-again Christians residing in 
states where these measures were on the ballot more likely than other potential voters to have 
expressed an intention prior to the election? 
 As implied above, research on this question has yielded more findings on the side of the 
null hypothesis that the ballot measures ultimately did not systematically increase turnout among 
evangelicals in noncompetitive states—or in presidential battlegrounds (Burden 2004, 
Abramowitz 2004, Smith et. al 2006, Smith et. al 2005, Karol and Miguel 2007). Rather, 
research has indicated that increases in (overall) turnout in 2004 were associated with states 
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whose electoral votes were being contested by both parties in the presidential election, and/or 
states where there was a competitive Senate contest on the ballot (McDonald 2004).  
  One scholar who has analyzed the aggregate effect the ballot propositions had on turnout 
found that the marriage amendments had their greatest impact in states that were not competitive 
in the presidential election. Among non-battleground states, the turnout rate was up 7.0 percent 
from 2000 in the eight states that voted on a marriage ballot proposition, while the turnout rate 
was up only 4.0 percent in the non-battleground states that did not vote on a marriage 
amendment (McDonald 2004). Ultimately, though, overall turnout in these states was lower 
(56.7 percent) than it was in the non-battlegrounds that did not vote on a marriage amendment 
(58.8 percent).  
  Conversely, in 2004, presidential battlegrounds had both higher turnout and a higher 
turnout rate compared with non-battleground states. Turnout in the competitive states was 65.9 
percent (+8.3 from 2000), while turnout in the noncompetitive states was 58.4 percent (+4.7 
percent from 2000), a significant difference of 7.5 percentage points moving from contested to 
uncontested states. 
 McDonald analyzed aggregate data, however, and did not examine how the initiatives 
and referenda may have influenced turnout among evangelicals in particular states. And on that 
question, some empirical evidence shows that evangelicals were mobilized to turn out to vote in 
states that voted on marriage amendments, and particularly in Ohio, which is a useful case study 
for scholars due to a number of factors. Some of these include: its presidential battleground 
status; its having a marriage initiative on the ballot—Issue 1—and; its status as one of the states 
where the marriage amendment is said not only to have increased turnout among evangelicals, 
but also where it is said to have directly affected the outcome of the presidential contest. Ohio 
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carried with it added importance in 2004—given that had Kerry won the state’s 20 electoral 
votes he would have garnered the necessary 270 electoral votes to win the presidency, everything 
else equal.  
Turnout in Ohio in 2004 was 72 percent of registered voters (Green 2006), up 10 percent 
from 2000 (McMahon 2005)—after South Dakota, the second highest rate of increase in the 
nation (Donovan et al. 2005). Current Family Research Council President Tony Perkins has 
asserted that Issue 1 made the difference for Bush in Ohio. According to Perkins’ analysis, had 
values voters comprised the 18 percent of the electorate they did in Pennsylvania, rather than the 
23 percent they made up in Ohio, Bush would have lost a raw number of 139,807 votes 
(McMahon 2005), which would have been enough for Kerry to win the state, and thus the 
presidency. Bush ended up winning Ohio by approximately 118,000 votes in November (Smith 
et al. 2005). But given Perkins role as a political activist and a possible vested interest he may 
have had in promulgating a values voters meme for the 2004 election outcome, his analysis does 
not carry as much weight in this thesis as that which other scholars have disseminated.  
 Smith et al. (2005, 2006) have used county-level data to determine that areas with larger 
concentrations of evangelical populations in Michigan and Ohio did not show higher levels of 
turnout relative to the rest of the state (Smith et al. 2006). The conclusion of these scholars is that 
turnout was up across the board in both Michigan and Ohio (2006).  
 Findings regarding how the marriage initiatives and referenda affected presidential vote 
choice are more in unison and are collectively stronger than the findings regarding how they may 
have influenced turnout. And, these findings are consistent with a claim that the ballot measures 
pertaining to gay-marriage had the net effect of increasing the president’s vote share in these 
states. 
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Bush Vote Share as Function of Marriage Amendments 
  In 2004, voters who identified themselves as born-again, evangelical, or fundamentalist 
Christians were significantly more likely than others to mention that gay-marriage was a very 
important issue consideration for them in deciding how to cast their ballot for president 
(Donovan et al. 2008). As outlined above, the evidence is not clear-cut that these groups were 
mobilized to vote at a higher rate relative to the rest of the electorate. But might they have netted 
the president more votes relative to other demographics?  
 One study that merged county-level religious, socioeconomic, and political data with 
2004 election results found that, at least in Ohio, the density of evangelicals in a county was 
positively related to support for Bush (Smith et al. 2006). In Michigan, the same study yielded 
results which showed that the county-level proportion of Catholics had a positive effect on 
Bush’s vote share, but that the percentage of evangelicals per county was not a statistically 
significant predictor of vote choice (2006).  
 The effects the ballot measures may have had on the presidential vote, however, may not 
just be limited to a purported increase in mobilization for Bush among evangelicals and other 
values voters. Opposition to gay-marriage in 2004 was consistently strong across demographics, 
and may have had the effect of increasing Bush’s vote share from other voting blocs as well. For 
instance, Smith et al. found that in Ohio, Issue 1 increased the president’s vote share across 
demographics, not just among evangelicals (2005).   
 In Ohio, two factors—issue priming and issue mobilization—may have interacted with 
one another to create a simultaneous effect for Bush (Donovan et al. 2005). But looking at the 
specific case studies of Ohio and Michigan, Donovan et al. found no direct effect of issue 
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mobilization on intentions to support Bush (2005). This same finding can be applied to the other 
marriage amendment states as well (Karol and Miguel 2007).  
 Campbell and Monson, however, have found that evangelicals who resided in states that 
voted on a marriage amendment were mobilized to vote for Bush at a higher rate than those in 
states that did not vote on an amendment (Campbell and Monson 2008). These scholars also 
found, however, that Republican secularists in these same states were demobilized (2008). But, 
since evangelicals are in greater abundance than are secularists in the Republican Party, the net 
effect was, in all likelihood, still a gain for Bush. Indeed, in 2004, evangelicals comprised the 
largest demographic group for Bush, constituting 35 percent of his supporters (Keeter 2005).  
 Scholars’ attempts to disentangle the marriage issue itself from the much more broadly-
defined “moral values” has led to some different conclusions regarding the role the gay-marriage 
issue is said to have played in influencing the outcome of the presidential election. Hillygus and 
Shields found that the marriage issue (and abortion) had no effect on voter decision making 
among Independents, voters living in battleground states, or on voters living in states with 
marriage amendments on the ballot (2005). These scholars, as well as others, have determined 
that the Iraq War, the economy, and terrorism were all considerably more important to voters in 
deciding how to cast their ballot for president (Mulligan 2008, Lewis 2005). 
 In terms of the specific factors one can attribute Bush’s re-election victory to, other 
possibilities include: the president’s incumbent status (Denton Jr. 2005), as well as his advantage 
over Kerry on the terrorism issue (Abramowitz 2004). Abramowitz noted that in three states 
directly affected by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks—New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut—Bush 
gained an average of 5.4 percentage points relative to 2000, compared to the 2.5 percent average 
he gained in the rest of the country (2004).  
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THEORETICAL RELEVANCE 
 Would it have been reasonable for Republican strategists to expect that the marriage 
amendments on the ballot in 2004 would systematically increase turnout overall, and not just 
among their evangelical base? Theorists of participatory democracy would contend that that 
would have been a reasonable expectation. Theories of participatory democracy hold that if 
democratic institutions offer people greater opportunities to participate in decisions, those 
institutions may have an “educative” effect on them (Tolbert et al. 2009). Educative effects of 
democracy include such things as: enhancing citizen engagement, building confidence in 
government, mobilizing interest groups and political parties, and increasing voter turnout, among 
other things (Tolbert et al. 2009). 
 An abundance of evidence exists, too, which lends support to theories of participatory 
democracy as they relate to turnout. The general consensus among scholars appears to be that 
forms of direct democracy, like initiatives and referenda, for example, generally have the net 
effect of increasing turnout in most elections (Tolbert et al. 2001, Tolbert and Smith 2005, 
Childers and Binder 2010). In nearly all cases, scholars agree that the effect of increasing turnout 
is more pronounced in midterm elections than in presidential elections (Childers and Binder 
2010).  
 Disagreement is found on the question of whether ballot measures have the effect of 
increasing turnout in presidential elections. Recent works have shown that ballot measures have 
had this effect in presidential elections, and in the 2004 election in particular, initiatives were 
found to be the cause of an increase in overall turnout (Lewis 2005, McDonald 2004). For the 
most part, though, past findings have generally shown that ballot measures do not have the effect 
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of increasing turnout in presidential elections. The high stimulus of the presidential election has 
generally drowned out any effect other electoral contests have on turnout (Everson 1981).   
 The mobilization of interest groups seems to be a possible causal mechanism that can 
account for the possibility that evangelicals (or values voters) may have turned out in higher 
numbers in the 2004 election. In terms of the marriage initiatives functioning to increase turnout, 
it is plausible that churches in the relevant states may have attempted to mobilize members in the 
body to turn out and vote in favor of the marriage amendments.  
 Churches may have also demonstrated influence by spending advertising dollars in the 
relevant states as well. If it was in fact interest groups that were responsible for stimulating a 
possible increase in turnout among evangelicals in 2004, it is likely that mobilization among the 
relevant subgroup would be consistent across parties. In other words, it should not matter that an 
evangelical or born-again Christian is a Republican, Democrat, or Independent. It should only 
matter that he or she belongs to the interest group attempting to mobilize the targeted population. 
If an interest group explanation is plausible, turnout among evangelicals should be consistent 
across parties. 
 On the other hand, if it was the Republicans’ base-mobilization strategy that caused a 
possible increase in turnout, it seems that mobilization among the relevant subgroup 
(evangelicals) would only be specific to Republican voters. As mentioned earlier, half of the 
Republicans’ strategy consisted of attempting to increase turnout among culturally conservative 
voters concerned or upset about threats to traditional values. These strategists would have most 
likely focused their efforts in Republican areas, rather than in Democratic ones, knowing that 
party identification is usually the best predictor of vote choice in partisan contests.  
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 Another mechanism by which turnout among evangelicals may have increased in the 
2004 election is the marriage campaigns themselves. Advertising dollars spent in the relevant 
states may have translated to greater recognition of the ballot propositions, and subsequently 
greater interest and awareness among the electorate, which could have led to higher turnout. In 
other words, the campaigns could have had the effect of stimulating the interest of peripheral 
voters.  
 The substance of the propositions could have also functioned to increase turnout. Social 
issues such as: abortion, same-sex marriage (and homosexual rights), stem-cell research, 
euthanasia, civil rights, and drug policies tap core values that reflect deeply held beliefs and are 
thus often seen as more meaningful to citizens than other more complex issues (Biggers 2009). 
Grummel writes that a sizable portion of the electorate holds a strong and uncompromising 
position on the values embodied in policies that pertain to morality, and that these 
uncompromising positions are often based on religious beliefs (2008). Moral issues, especially, 
have been found to be highly salient with the electorate (Biggers 2009), and voters tend to 
display greater awareness of these issues than others that appear on ballots as well (Nicholson 
2003). Moral issues have been found to be the cause of an increase turnout in past elections—
when they have been on the ballot (Grummel 2008).  
   The issue priming phenomenon associated with ballot initiatives is a possible mechanism 
that may have been at work in terms of increasing turnout among evangelicals, and subsequently 
affecting the presidential contest as well. There is some evidence that certain issues, when they 
appear on the ballot, have the effect of causing voters to mention that particular issue as 
important to them, and subsequently a factor that was considered in their vote choice. And, there 
is some empirical evidence that the marriage initiatives and referenda had a priming effect on 
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support for Bush in 2004 (Donovan et al. 2008, Donovan et al. 2005). Voters living in states 
where gay-marriage was on the ballot were more likely to mention that issue as being “very 
important” in their consideration of presidential candidates (2008, 2005). And ultimately, voters 
who reported in surveys as having been “very concerned” about gay-marriage were more likely 
to vote for Bush in 2004 (Donovan et al. 2008), irrespective of religious affiliation. In this thesis, 
though, I do not test for a priming influence (or the effects of marriage campaigns) that may have 
functioned to stimulate turnout or influence vote choice. 
 Instead, I develop a research design that expounds on the one Campbell and Monson 
constructed in a 2008 article published in a scholarly journal6. I break down turnout models 
(actually, intention to vote models) by parties, and include an encompassing model that 
combines all potential voters together in a single model. This should function to enhance 
understanding on whether increased mobilization of evangelicals, if it occurred at all, was 
consistent across parties, as an interest group explanation would hold, or if it was confined to 
Republicans, as an explanation that pertains to electoral strategy would contend.  
 Further, I estimate an additional model that tests for the independent variables of interest 
(born-again Protestants, gay-marriage state, etc.) on presidential vote choice. Campbell and 
Monson’s key finding in their article is ambiguous in that it does not give a clear understanding 
on the difference between mobilization and vote choice among evangelicals in the 2004 election. 
Their conclusion is that: “… (white) evangelical Protestants had a higher level of mobilization 
for Bush in states with a gay-marriage initiative (on the ballot)” (Campbell and Monson 2008).  
It appears as though the authors are attempting to convey that evangelicals both turned 
out in higher numbers than other groups in 2004, and that they also voted for Bush at higher rates 
                                                 
6
 The article Campbell and Monson wrote is entitled: “The Religion Card: Gay-Marriage and the 2004 Election” and 
was published in Public Opinion Quarterly in 2008 (Vol. 72, No. 3). 
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than other groups. But, it is interpreted such that they are attempting to account for two different 
phenomena without their legitimately having evidence to do so. Moreover, only one probit 
regression is included in their article, with the dependent variable a dichotomous one that 
measured factors that influenced vote choice. Thus, it seems that the authors did in fact test for 
vote choice as a function of the interaction of identification as an evangelical and residence in a 
gay-marriage state—but not necessarily turnout. In this thesis, I test for most of the factors 
Campbell and Monson used in their design, on both intention to turn out in November and 
presidential vote choice. 
The theoretical points related to interest group mobilization and electoral strategy 
outlined above serve as the foundation for the hypotheses in this thesis, and for the empirical 
analysis to follow.    
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1: Self-reported intention to vote in the 2004 presidential election is 
positively related to 1) identification as a born-again Protestant Christian; and 2) an interaction 
term measuring identification as a born-again Protestant and residence in a gay-marriage ban 
state.   
 Hypothesis 2: Self-reported vote for President Bush in 2004 is positively related to 1) 
identification as a born-again Protestant Christian; and 2) an interaction measuring the effects of 
identification as a born-again Protestant and residence in a gay-marriage ban state.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 For this design, the two sources of data used are the 2004 National Annenberg Election 
Survey (NAES) and the 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES). To empirically test 
for the hypotheses, logistic regression is the statistical method that is used to determine the 
effects the main independent variables of interest (born-again Protestant, gay-marriage state, 
born-again × gay-marriage state interaction) have on the dichotomous dependent variables 
(intention to vote and presidential vote choice). In place of a measure gauging intention to vote, a 
dummy variable for reported turnout is substituted in the ANES turnout model.   
Data 
 The 2004 NAES is the main source of data for this research design. For the 2004 election, 
the NAES conducted a broad and expansive survey that spanned more than 13 months (Oct. 7, 
2003 – Nov. 16, 2004) and included 81,422 randomly selected U.S. adults for telephone 
interviews. One obvious advantage this dataset offers is that the large sample of observations 
ultimately permits one to draw strong, definitive conclusions from the empirical findings—
assuming a sound research design is in place. The large number of observations in the sample 
also means that, unlike with other sources that consist of survey data, the NAES sample 
potentially allows researchers the ability to isolate a single state (or multiple states) for testing 
purposes.  
 The 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) consists of only 1,212 responses 
in total. The number of observations from any single state is relatively small, and simply does 
not provide the needed number for a strong design, particularly with the questions attempting to 
be answered in this design. The NAES, on the other hand, averages more than 1,000 
observations per state. Thus, creating a dummy variable for the 11 states that had a marriage 
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amendment on the ballot in November, and using NAES data, yields over 15,000 observations of 
potential voters living in marriage amendment states. Conversely, creating a similar dummy 
variable using ANES data yields only 200 observations of residents in marriage states.  
 In addition to low numbers of observations associated with typical post-election surveys, 
another common problem with them is that there are fewer variables for researchers to parse 
through, and often less than ideal measures of the variables that were attempted to be measured. 
For instance, the ANES does not provide a specific measure of evangelicalism. It only 
categorizes respondents by denomination based on whether they attend service on a weekly 
basis. In comparison, the NAES not only categorizes respondents based on their religious 
denomination and propensity to attend service, but the more detailed questionnaire also provides 
a measure of evangelicalism by asking interviewees whether they considered themselves to be an 
evangelical/born-again Christian.  
 In some instances, though, models using ANES data may produce more accurate results 
than those which models using NAES data produce. In these cases, the ANES will function to 
serve as a point of analysis. But, with the low number of observations in the dataset, the ANES 
models in this design mostly function to substantiate or refute findings the NAES models 
produce.  
 One flaw of the NAES dataset is that it does not provide a completely valid measure of 
evangelicalism. The 2004 NAES does contain a question inquiring of respondents whether they 
considered themselves to be an “evangelical/born-again Christian.” But this question obviously 
combines evangelicals with respondents who did not identify as evangelical, but did identify as 
“born-again,” which ultimately provides for a measure of evangelicalism that is much higher 
than this group’s proportion of the 2004 electorate. Indeed, the tabulation shows that the yes/no 
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divide on this question is approximately 40 percent/60 percent, significantly higher than the 23 
percent of voters who identified as evangelical Christian on the national exit poll previously 
cited.  
 There are problems associated with the 2004 NAES dataset, but those found in the ANES 
dataset (and other typical post-election surveys) are more obvious, and make it a much less ideal 
choice for use in this design. 
Dependent Variables 
 In place of the reported turnout variable in the NAES model, I use a measure of voting 
intention. This variable should function similar to that of a reported turnout measure in that a 
number of respondents, who actually did not intend to vote, will indicate that they did because of 
the social desirability pressure factor that accompanies voting. Indeed, of the approximately 
33,000 respondents who were asked this question in the NAES sample, more than 90 percent of 
the sample indicated that they intended to vote in November.  
 It is likely that this measure of voting intention may be even less valid than those that 
accompany measures of reported turnout, which have generally been found to be greatly inflated. 
Studies that measure validated voting have shown that reported turnout can be as much as 7.0 – 
11.5 percent higher than election day turnout (Anderson and Silver 1986), or even as much as 
20.0 – 30.0 percent higher than election day turnout (Silver et al. 1986). But while the question 
the NAES asked may not be a valid measure of who actually intended to turn out to vote in 2004, 
it should still be a reliable one. Pressure to indicate an intention to vote should be relatively 
consistent across demographic groups, and across the states. 
 In those instances where the pressure may have been greater for certain groups of people 
to indicate that they intended to vote, findings on the characteristics that have tended to factor 
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into overreporting help formulate the research design, and can help corroborate or refute 
empirical findings from the logit models. A safe assumption is that the same characteristics that 
predict overreporting post-election would be the most significant characteristics factoring into 
respondents’ expressing an intention to vote pre-election. Scholars have an idea about which 
demographic characteristics best predict validated turnout, as well as overreporting, and I use 
past findings in this area to guide expectations regarding which individuals were most likely to 
indicate prior to the election that they intended to vote in November 2004.  
 The dependent variable for voting intention is simply coded 0 for those who indicated 
prior to the election that they did not plan to vote and 1 for those who—prior to the election—
expressed an intention to vote in November.  
 The dependent variable in the presidential vote choice model simply measures who 
NAES respondents voted for in 2004. The variable is coded such that 1 = vote for Bush, and 0 = 
vote for Kerry, Ralph Nader, or someone else. This question was asked of respondents over two 
different time periods (both pre- and post-election)—and contains approximately 1,500 
responses7. In the dataset, responses from both questions are combined to create a single 
variable. 
 That the dependent variable only has 1,500 responses associated with it is one downside 
to this measure of vote choice, and ultimately means that the number of observations in the vote 
choice model will be substantially reduced in comparison to the intention to vote models—which 
consist of nearly 20,000 observations in all, and more than 5,000 apiece broken down by party. 
But, the presidential vote choice model still yields over 1,000 observations—enough from which 
one can draw meaningful conclusions.  
                                                 
7
 For exact question wordings of the relevant variables, see the description of the NAES variables in the appendix (p. 
53-55).  
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 Since both of the dependent variables in this design are dichotomous, I conduct logistic 
regression analysis to estimate the effects of the relevant independent variables on stated 
intentions to vote (among all potential voters combined, and among Republicans, Democrats, 
and Independents separately) and presidential vote choice (among all potential voters). 
Independent Variables 
One of the main independent variables of interest in this design is a constructed 
variable—referred to as Born-again Protestant—that combines the effects of respondents 
identifying themselves as born-again/evangelical Christians and attending services at a church of 
a Protestant denomination. Scholars have found that the mobilization of evangelicals is often 
maximized when social issues are either on the ballot or are major factors of the political 
campaign (Biggers 2009). As mentioned above, the NAES does not provide a single measure of 
evangelicalism. Rather, it combines respondents who identify as either a born-again or an 
evangelical Christian into one dichotomous variable. In order to get closer to the effect of 
identification as an evangelical Christian, I combine the “yes” observations of this variable with 
the observations of another variable, in which respondents claimed attendance at church services 
of various denominations.  
 Specifically, the relevant questions in the NAES survey are: “Do you consider yourself 
an evangelical or born-again Christian?”8 and for those who attend weekly services, “Do you 
attend services at a Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or Mormon church?”9 Since evangelicals are 
affiliated with the Protestant religion, I have combined the observations for this response with 
those also identifying as evangelical/born-again Christian to obtain a better measure of 
evangelicalism. Thus, this is a simple dichotomous variable where 1 = born-again Protestants, 
                                                 
8
 2004 NAES codebook, page 361 
9
 2004 NAES codebook, page 360 
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and 0 = else. Instead of using the single measure of evangelicalism the NAES provides, the 
constructed variable at least reduces the proportion of evangelicals to 38 percent (down from 42 
percent). This is far from a perfect measure of evangelicalism, of course, but it seems to be the 
best one that can be utilized with the questions and responses from this dataset. Instead of 
including Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and others who may have identified as “born-again,” the 
constructed variable limits the responses to those who indicated that they attend service at a 
Protestant church, and who also identified as a born-again/evangelical Christian. 
  Another variable of interest, Gay-marriage state, is also a dichotomous one, where 1 
refers to the 11 states that had a marriage amendment on the November ballot10, and 0 refers to 
the other 39 states and Washington D.C. As outlined above, the marriage issue tended to be more 
salient with voters in states where it was on the ballot. With some findings indicating that 
initiatives have had the effect of increasing turnout in presidential elections, respondents who 
lived in marriage amendment states may have been more likely than those living outside them to 
express an intention to vote.  
 Tolbert et al. (2009) conducted an individual-level analysis on voter turnout as a function 
of initiatives appearing on state ballots, and found that voters living in a state with more 
initiatives on the ballot were more likely to vote in the 2004 election. Daniel Biggers looked 
specifically at social issue ballot measures in the 2004 election and found that the presence of 
each additional social measure led to an increase in the likelihood of an individual’s voting by 
2.3 percent (Biggers 2009). 
 Since intention to vote (and support for Bush) among evangelicals may be conditioned by 
living in a marriage amendment state, as Campbell and Monson have claimed is the case, an 
                                                 
10
 Marriage amendment states include: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.  
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interaction term is used. Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state is an interaction term that 
measures the effect of respondents residing in one of the 11 marriage amendment states, and 
identifying as a born-again Protestant. It is expected that this variable will be positively related to 
expressed intention of voting (and support for Bush), as Biggers has demonstrated that turnout 
among evangelicals can be heavily influenced when social issues are on the ballot (2009). 
 Since there is evidence that turnout was up in the states that were contested by both 
presidential candidates (McDonald 2004), I include a variable for battleground states, where 1 
equals the 11 states that were decided by five percentage points of fewer in the popular vote11, 
and where 0 represents the remaining 39 states and Washington D.C. Respondents in one of 
these presidential battleground states may have been more likely to vote than those living outside 
them, perhaps thinking that their vote was potentially more valuable than it would have been in 
another state that was not contested by both presidential candidates. 
 In the presidential vote logit model, a variable—Marriage amendment—that tests for the 
effect of opposition to gay-marriage on support for Bush is included. This question, in particular, 
asked: “Do you favor an amendment to the U.S Constitution that would prohibit states from 
marrying same-sex couples?” An ordinal variable where 0 refers to respondents who strongly 
oppose a Constitutional amendment; 1 = somewhat oppose; 2 = neither approve nor oppose; 3 = 
somewhat approve; and 4 = strongly approve, is used to measure this factor. The expectation is 
that this variable will be highly significant for Bush, since the findings up to this point agree (and 
are clear) that people opposed to gay-marriage were more likely to vote for Bush in 2004, 
controlling for other factors. 
                                                 
11
 In this design, battleground states include the 11 states whose electoral votes were decided by fewer than five 
percentage points in the popular vote in November: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
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 Ideally, other variables that measured opinions and attitudes on salient issues in the 2004 
election (the economy, the Iraq War, terrorism, etc.) would be included in this type of model, for 
the purpose of determining how well the marriage issue predicted vote choice relative to other 
issues. But, multicollinearity with the independent variables of interest is the result of including 
other issue variables in the NAES vote choice model. Absent these variables, then, the marriage 
amendment variable should only function to inform on whether the issue, by itself, is positively 
related to vote choice, as has been found to be the case in the 2004 election.   
Control Variables 
 A number of control variables that have been found to influence turnout and vote choice 
are included in each of these models, and help get closer to the actual effects of born-again 
Protestantism and residence in a gay-marriage state on both voting intention and presidential 
vote choice.  
 Affiliation with a political party and strength of one’s party identification has been found 
to be positively related to turnout (Timpone 1998), and here, a dummy variable indicates whether 
respondents mentioned their partisan affiliation as either strong or not strong (0 = not strong; 1 = 
strong). The expectation is that this control will be positively related to voting intention. The 
variable for party identification is most relevant to the presidential vote choice model. For this 
control variable, 0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; and, 2 = Republicans. Party identification has 
tended to serve as the factor that best predicts vote choice in partisan elections. Thus, this 
variable should be the one most strongly related to support for Bush in the vote choice models. 
 Ideology is a standard control variable that is included in a lot of turnout models. Here, 
Conservatism is an ordinal variable that places respondents’ ideology on a five-point scale. Zero 
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= very liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = moderate; 3 = conservative; 4 = very conservative. If ideology is a 
predictor of vote choice, the coefficient should be positively signed in the vote choice model.  
 Ideology strength groups respondents who indicated that they were either very liberal or 
very conservative into one category, with those indicating less strong ideologies (conservative or 
liberal) into another category, with moderates in a category by themselves. Specifically, 0 = 
moderates; 1 = conservative or liberal; 2 = very conservative or very liberal.  
 A person’s level of education has been found to be the strongest predictor of turnout in 
the United States (Abramson and Clagett 1984). But, education has also been found to be one of 
the characteristics most positively related to overreporting as well (Anderson and Silver 1986, 
Silver et al. 1986, Granberg and Holmberg 1991, Bernstein et al. 2001). The NAES broke down 
respondents’ education levels into nine categories, ranging from those with an eighth grade 
education or lower, to those owning a graduate or professional degree. For education, the 
variable is coded such that the low value (0) refers to those with an eighth grade education or 
lower, and the high value (8) refers to those possessing a graduate or professional degree12. It is 
expected that for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, education will be positively related 
to stated intention of voting. 
 Bernstein et al. (2001) show that higher-status voters are among the groups of people 
most likely to overreport voting. This would almost certainly include those living in higher 
income households. Individuals in these households, then, may be more likely than potential 
voters living in lower income households to indicate an intention to vote.  As with education, the 
NAES broke down respondents’ household incomes into nine categories, ranging from those 
earning less than $10,000 annually to those earning more than $150,000 per year. And as with 
                                                 
12
 See variable appendix (p. 53-55) for a detailed breakdown of NAES variable codings.  
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education, the variable (Household income) is coded such that 0 refers to the lowest annual 
household income, and 8 refers to the highest annual household income. 
 Age is yet another factor that has been found to influence both voter turnout and 
overreporting. Past studies have found that turnout increases as a function of age, but that there is 
a curvilinear effect associated with this relationship (Timpone 1998). Once voters reach a certain 
plateau, turnout begins to decrease with age. The age of respondents in the NAES sample ranges 
from 18 – 97 years. This variable has not been recoded and will function as a continuous variable 
in each of the logit models. Because of the curvilinear effect that’s been found to be associated 
with turnout, I incorporate a variable (Age-squared) into the models to determine if there is such 
an effect associated with voting intention and age.  
 Evidence exists which shows that men are more likely to overreport voting than women 
(Granberg and Holmberg 1991). Thus, a control for respondents’ sex is included in this design. A 
dichotomous variable, with men coded as 0s and women as 1s, is incorporated into each of the 
logit models.  
 Along with education, the other demographic characteristic that has most commonly been 
found to be positively related to overreporting is race. Typically, studies have shown that blacks 
are more likely to overreport voting than are whites, although the difference is not substantial 
(Anderson and Silver 1986, Silver et al. 1986, Abramson and Clagett 1984, Silver et al. 1986, 
Bernstein et al. 2001).  
 In identifying respondents’ race, the NAES prefaced interviewees with a question 
inquiring whether they were of Hispanic or Latino descent. If no, interviewees were then asked 
which racial category they best fit under. Two dichotomous variables for race are included in the 
models. The first, Hispanic, simply indicates whether respondents were of Hispanic or Latino 
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descent (1) or not (0). The second, Black, combines other racial minorities (Asian, American- 
Indian, and other) with whites into one category (0), and places blacks into a separate category 
by themselves (1).  
 Marital status is included in this design to control for the effect of being married, on both 
intention to vote and presidential vote choice. There is some evidence that married voters tend to 
turn out at higher rates than non-married voters (Timpone 1998), but not as much that they tend 
to overreport relative to unmarried potential voters. This variable may be more significant in the 
vote choice model, then, since Bush is said to have done better with married women voters in 
2004 than in 2000 (Burden 2004).   
 A dummy variable for the South is also included in this design. If the intention to vote 
models are a good predictor of actual turnout in November, this coefficient should be negatively 
signed, since voters living in the South tend to turn out at lower rates than voters living in other 
regions. This variable is coded 1 for the 11 states of the old Confederacy13, and 0 for the 
remaining 39 states and Washington D.C. 
 Finally, a dummy variable for Catholic voters is incorporated into the models, mostly for 
the purpose of comparing intention to vote among Catholics with intention to vote among born-
again Protestants. This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for potential voters who identified as 
Catholic and 0 for those who did not identify as such. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Eleven states of the Old Confederacy include: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia 
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FINDINGS 
NAES Voter Intention Models 
 There is some empirical support for the hypothesis that identification as a born-again 
Protestant is positively related to expressed intention to vote. But, while the statistical 
relationship between the variables is relatively strong, the substantive one seems to be relatively  
weak.14Table 1 (p. 32) shows that the relationship between expressed intention to vote and 
identification as a born-again Protestant is significant at the .01 level for all potential voters, but 
among parties, the relationship is only significant at the .10 level (for both Republicans and 
Independents). It could be the case that the large number of observations in the model that 
includes all potential voters detected a relationship between the variables that does not 
substantively exist.  
 Because the independent variables in the intention to vote models explain a relatively low 
percentage of the variance (approximate ranges are from 14 percent to 17.5 percent), predicted 
probabilities are not shown for these variables. Notwithstanding the low pseudo r-squared values 
of the models, though, the number of observations ranges from a low of approximately 5,400 for 
the model of Independents to as high as nearly 20,000 for the model that includes all potential 
voters—a sufficient number from which one can draw strong conclusions. 
 There is also little substantive evidence that voters who lived in gay-marriage states may 
have been more likely to vote in November than those living outside them. Table 1 shows that 
the relationship between intention to vote and residence in a gay-marriage state is significant at 
the .05 level. It’s noteworthy, though, that this variable is not statistically related to any of 
                                                 
14
 See Table 1 on page 32 for full results the logit models using NAES data produced. Asterisks indicate the 
variables that are statistically related to intention to vote—among all potential voters, and then broken down by 
party. Table 4 (p. 40) shows the results from a similar logit model using ANES data, with reported turnout 
substituted in place of intention to vote as the dependent variable.  
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TABLE 1. FACTORS AFFECTING INTENTION TO VOTE AMONG SUBSETS OF VOTERS (NAES RESULTS)15 
 
 
All potential 
voters 
 
Republicans 
only 
 
Democrats 
only 
 
Independents 
only 
         
Born-again Protestant 0.2523*** 0.3320* 0.1005 0.2434* 
Catholic 0.1814** 0.0323 0.2925** 0.1612 
Gay-marriage state 0.2550** 0.4219 0.2190 0.2224 
Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state -0.0819 -0.2481 -0.0083 -0.0278 
Battleground states -0.0716 0.0881 -0.0668 -0.1271 
South -0.1485* -0.3446** -0.0801 -0.0391 
Party identification strength 0.5716*** 0.9339*** 0.8016*** 0.1970* 
Ideology strength 0.1111** 0.2396** 0.1071 -0.0860 
Education 0.2360*** 0.2697*** 0.2264*** 0.2198*** 
Household income 0.2320*** 0.2397*** 0.1921*** 0.2366*** 
Black 0.4834*** -0.5474 0.6089*** 0.5510*** 
Hispanic -1.1029*** -1.2623*** -0.9654*** -1.1855*** 
Marital status -0.0582 0.0534 -0.1254 -0.1027 
Sex  0.2677*** 0.0699 0.1900* 0.3306*** 
Age -0.0009 -0.0210 0.0068 0.0103 
Age-squared 0.0003** 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0002 
Party identification 0.0684  -- -- -- 
Conservatism 0.1312***  -- -- -- 
Constant -0.4989* 0.5287 -0.0936 -0.5611 
          
 Number of observations = 19,753 = 7,669 = 6,726 = 5,358 
 Pseudo r-squared = 0.1606 = 0.1670 = 0.1439 = 0.1745 
      
* indicates p < .10         
** indicates p < .05         
*** indicates p < .01         
                                                 
15
 Dependent variable in model is Intend to Vote in 2004 General Election (0 = no; 1 = yes) 
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Republicans, Democrats, or Independents’ expressing an intention to vote—but was only related 
to expressed intention to vote when all of the groups were combined. Again, the large number of 
observations in the model may have made it such that a relationship between the variables is 
detected, despite a substantive relationship between the variables not actually existing.  
 The interaction measuring born-again Protestant identification and living in a marriage 
state is not statistically significant for any group (or for all potential voters), and the coefficient is 
negative in each of the models. If Campbell and Monson’s conclusion is that evangelicals living 
in marriage amendment states were more likely to turn out than evangelicals living in other 
states, there is no support for it based on findings from the NAES.  
 Identification as a Catholic is also strongly related to expressed intention to vote among 
all potential voters, but only among Democrats across parties. For both groups, the relationship is 
significant at the .05 level, with the larger coefficient value present for Democrats. In terms of 
predicting the change in born-again Protestants and Catholics’ intending to vote, the likelihood 
of expressing an intention to vote is higher among Protestants than among Catholics. 
 To the extent that these findings on expressed intention to vote can be extrapolated to 
those in the turnout literature, similar factors that have been found to predict turnout are 
significant in the NAES models. Some of these include: strength of party identification, 
education, and household income. Strongly identifying with a party is a good predictor of 
indicating an intention to vote in 2004, especially for Republicans and Democrats, but much less 
so for Independents.  
 Among all potential voters, and across parties, education and household income are 
strongly related to one’s expressing an intention to vote. For Republicans, Democrats, and 
Independents, both of these coefficients are significant at the .01 level. The coefficient values for 
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these two variables are highly consistent across the models, with nearly identical values present 
for the variables for all potential voters (0.2360 for education and 0.2320 for household 
income)16.  
 Among all potential voters, strength of one’s ideology is also found to be positively 
related to expressed intention to vote (.05 level), but only among potential Republican voters (.05 
level) by party. The similarly strong coefficient for conservatism corroborates that it was 
conservative voters, rather than liberal ones, who were most motivated to turn out in 2004.  
 Another characteristic that is positively and strongly related (.01) to intention to turn out 
among all voters is the dummy variable for blacks. For Democrats and Independents, too, the 
relationships are significant at the .01 level. Since there is seemingly nothing unique about the 
2004 election that may have stimulated blacks to turn out at a higher rate than usual in 
November, one may posit that this racial group may account for some of the large discrepancy 
between actual voting and the expressed intention to vote evident in the NAES question. 
Scholars have found that blacks are one of the groups of potential voters most likely to 
overreport, and this seems like the most likely explanation for this specific finding in the 
intention to vote models. It is noteworthy, though, that when other factors have been controlled 
for, scholars have found that blacks vote at higher rates than whites. 
 Women were also more likely than men to indicate an intention to vote prior to the 
election. Since men have been more likely than women to overreport in past studies, it could be 
that sex predicted actual turnout in 2004, with women more likely than men to vote. The 
relationship between sex and the dependent variable is significant at the .01 level for all potential 
voters, likewise for Independents, but only at the .10 level for Democrats. Republican women 
were not more likely than Republican men to indicate an intention to vote, however.  
                                                 
16
 Multicollinearity was tested for among the independent variables, but was not found to exist in the NAES models.  
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 The control variable most negatively related to expressed intention to vote is the dummy 
variable for potential Hispanic voters. Among all potential voters, and across parties, the 
negative relationship is significant at the .01 level in each of the four models. If the estimated 
models are a good predictor of who would actually turn out to vote in November, Hispanics were 
probably the ethnic group least likely to vote. This is not overly surprising given that Hispanics 
tend to vote at a lower rate relative to their share of the population.  
 The dummy variable for the South also shows a negative relationship with expressed 
intention to vote. The relationship is only significant at the .10 level for all potential voters, but is 
significant at the .05 level for Republicans. If valid, one could theorize that this may be due to 
the lack of competitive states throughout the region. President Bush ended up carrying every 
southern state in 2004, and perhaps potential Republican voters in these states perceived their 
vote as being less important than it would have been in a more hotly contested battleground state 
in the upper Midwest or Mountain West region, for example. In any event, turnout in the South is 
usually lower than it is in other regions for most elections.   
 Coefficients for the battleground state variables in the intention to vote models are not 
statistically significant. There is no evidence in the NAES models that potential voters residing 
in presidential battlegrounds were more likely than potential voters living in other states to 
indicate prior to the election that they would vote in November. This finding may be due simply 
to the social desirability factor that functioned to pressure all voters, regardless of the state they 
lived in, to indicate an intention to vote prior to the election.  
 Controls for marital status and age are both found to be unrelated to the dependent 
variable; although, removing the control for age that tests for the curvilinear effects makes the 
relationship between actual age and expressed intention to vote highly significant (.01 level), 
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which is consistent with findings in the turnout literature and in the literature on overreporting. 
Older voters are more likely than younger voters to vote, and are also more likely than younger 
voters to overreport (Anderson and Silver 1986). 
NAES Vote Choice Model Findings 
 The logit model that tests for the factors that may have influenced the presidential vote 
yields far fewer observations (1,010) than do the intention to vote models, but it explains a much 
higher percentage of the variance (61.27 percent). This model does show some support for the 
hypothesis regarding the predicted relationship between presidential vote and identification as a 
born-again Protestant, but none regarding the hypothesis as it pertains to marriage states. Table 2 
below shows that voters who identified as born-again Protestants were about 25 percentage 
points more likely to vote for Bush than were those who did not identify as such17. The positive 
relationship between these variables is significant at the .01 level, too. The interaction measuring 
born-again Protestantism and residence in a marriage amendment state is not significant again, 
nor is the dummy variable for gay-marriage ballot states. 
  
 TABLE 2. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED          
         VOTE CHOICE (NAES RESULTS) 
 
Variables Change  
  0-> 1  Min-> Max 
Born-again Protestant 0.2516 0.2516 
Marriage amendment 0.0728 0.2710 
Party identification 0.4573 0.8456 
Conservatism 0.1504 0.6654 
Black -0.4589 -0.4589 
                                                 
17
 The first column (0-> 1) indicates the predicted change in terms of increasing in one value on the variable scale 
(i.e., 1-> 2) on the marriage amendment scale. The second column (Min-> Max) indicates the predicted change in 
terms of moving from the lowest value on the variable scale to the highest one (i.e., 0-> 4 on the marriage scale). 
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 The variable added to the model to test for how the marriage issue itself may have 
functioned in the presidential election does show significance for Bush. Voters strongly 
supportive of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ban same-sex couples from marrying 
were more than 27 percentage points more likely to have voted for Bush than were those who 
strongly opposed one. 
  
 TABLE 3. FACTORS AFFECTING PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE (NAES  
         RESULTS)18 
  
Variables Coefficients 
 
 
Born-again Protestant 1.1042*** 
Catholic 0.3641 
Gay-marriage state 
-0.2135 
Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state 0.0650 
Marriage amendment 0.2918*** 
Party identification 2.4964*** 
Conservatism 0.8044*** 
Education 
-0.0804 
Household income 0.0280 
Black 
-2.0709*** 
Hispanic 
-0.6660 
Marital status 0.2411 
Sex 
-0.2642 
Age 
-0.0315 
Age-squared 0.0002 
Constant 
-3.6611*** 
 
 
N = 1,010 * indicates p < .10 
 ** indicates p < .05 
 *** indicates p < .01 
Pseudo r-squared = 0.6127  
 
                                                 
18
 Dependent variable in Table 3 is presidential vote choice (0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush). 
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 The only other factors in the model that predict support for Bush are, unsurprisingly, 
identification as a Republican, and identification as a conservative. For the former, the likelihood 
of voting for Bush increased by nearly 85 percentage points, moving from a Democratic voter to  
a Republican one. Very conservative voters were approximately 67 percentage points more 
likely than very liberal voters to have cast a ballot for Bush. Both of these relationships are 
significant at the highest level. 
 The dummy variable for race is the only independent variable negatively related to 
presidential vote choice. Black voters were 46 percentage points less likely to vote for Bush than 
were white voters and other minority voters, holding everything else constant. Control variables 
for marital status and sex are in the expected positive and negative directions, respectively. But, 
neither coefficient shows a statistically significant relationship with support for Bush or Kerry. 
 ANES Turnout Model Findings 
 Similar models estimated using data from the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) that test for reported turnout and vote choice have been included in this thesis for the 
purpose of corroborating or refuting results from the NAES. After including the relevant 
independent variables in the ANES logit model, the number of observations is reduced down to 
712 in all19. The model shows little support, though, that the main independent variables of 
interest are meaningful in terms of their having influenced turnout in 2004. 
 Like the NAES, the ANES, unfortunately, does not provide a good measure of 
evangelicalism. In its place, a simple dummy variable for Protestantism is included.20 Neither 
                                                 
19
 See Table 5 on page 41 for the predicted changes associated with the statistically significant independent 
variables.  
20
 Since evangelicals belong to the Protestant religion, this seems to be the best possible measure of evangelicalism 
in the available data. However, since the effects of marriage initiatives on turnout have been found to be less strong 
for Protestants than for evangelicals (Camp 2008), findings associated with this variable cannot be extrapolated to 
those in the measure for evangelicalism in the NAES models. For coding procedures of ANES variables, see 
variable appendix (p. 56-57). 
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this variable nor the dummy variable for Catholics is related to turnout in 200421. Likewise, the 
dummy variable for gay-marriage states, as well as the interaction term measuring Protestantism 
and residence in a gay-marriage state is not found to be related to turnout either22. It is important 
to note that the dummy variable for gay-marriage states was constructed absent data from five of 
the eleven states with a marriage amendment on the ballot in November; the sample the ANES 
collected simply does not contain responses from voters in those states, and is missing responses 
from voters in other states as well. 
 One significant difference between the NAES and ANES models is the statistical 
relationship each one estimated between intention to vote (turnout) and battleground states. 
Table 5 indicates that respondents living in one of the aforementioned eleven battleground states 
were approximately nine percentage points more likely to have voted than respondents not living 
in battleground states. The predicted change in this variable is similar to the actual difference 
(7.5 percent) McDonald found in the article he wrote on turnout. The relationship between 
turnout and battleground states is significant at the .01 level in the ANES model. 
 Controls that demonstrate a positive relationship with turnout include: conservatism, 
education, household income, and sex—similar to the findings in the NAES models. It seems, 
then, that women, conservatives, and highly-educated respondents were more likely to have 
voted in 2004 than men, liberals, and less-educated respondents, controlling for other factors. 
Each of these individual relationships is significant at the .05 level or greater. The relationship 
between turnout and household income is significant at the .10 level, with those living in 
                                                 
21
 See Table 4 (p. 40) for full results of the ANES Turnout logit model. 
22
 An alternate specification that uses a measure for moral traditionalism in place of the variable for Protestantism 
likewise does not show statistical significance as it relates to turnout. Similarly, the interaction term (moral 
traditionalism × gay-marriage state) substituted in place of the interaction term (Protestant × gay-marriage state) in 
the ANES turnout model is also not statistically related to turnout in another specification of the ANES turnout 
model.  
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households earning more than $120,000 per year nearly nine percentage points more likely to 
have voted than those living in households earning less than $9,000 per year. 
 Neither of the variables for age show a statistically significant relationship with turnout; 
however, once again, if the variable that tests for the curvilinear effect of age is removed, the 
continuous variable for age is found to be highly related (.05 level) to turnout in 2004. Moving  
  
 TABLE 4. FACTORS AFFECTING TURNOUT IN 2004 ELECTION (ANES  
         RESULTS)23 
 
Variables Coefficients 
   
Protestant 
-0.4915 
Catholic 
-0.4816 
Gay-marriage state 0.1068 
Protestant * gay-marriage state 
-0.6268 
Battleground states 0.9968*** 
South 
-0.2803 
Party identification 0.1741 
Conservatism 0.1994** 
Education 0.3777*** 
Household income 0.1032* 
Black 0.2837 
Hispanic 
-0.0435 
Marital status 0.1236 
Sex 0.4721** 
Age 0.0061 
Age-squared 0.0001 
Constant 
-1.5752* 
   
N = 712 * indicates p < .10 
 ** indicates p < .05 
Pseudo r-squared = 0.1332 *** indicates p < .01 
                                                 
23
 Dependent variable is dichotomous one measuring whether a respondent indicated that he or she voted in the 2004 
general election (0 = no; 1 = yes). 
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from the youngest voter to the oldest voter increased the probability that he or she voted by 
nearly 12 percentage points.  
 Coefficients controlling for the South and Hispanic voters are in the expected negative 
direction. But neither variable is significantly related to turnout in 2004. The control for marital 
status is also in the expected (positive) direction; however, this variable is also not related to 
turnout in 2004. 
 
 TABLE 5. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED      
         TURNOUT (ANES RESULTS)24 
 
Variables 0-> 1 Min-> Max 
      
Battleground states 0.0925 0.0925 
Conservatism 0.0318 0.1390 
Education 0.0908 0.3060 
Household income 0.0137 0.0853 
Sex 0.0519 0.0519 
 
ANES Vote Choice Model Findings 
 As with the turnout model, some of the results in the ANES vote choice model 
corroborate those found in the NAES models. Table 6 shows that Protestantism is positively 
related to support for Bush (.05 level)25. Specifically, Protestants were nearly 19 percentage 
points more likely than non-Protestants to vote for Bush in 2004, everything else equal26. The 
ANES model shows that Republicans were more likely to have voted for Bush than Democrats  
                                                 
24
 First column indicates change associated with increasing in one value on the scale of the relevant variable (i.e., 4-
5 for household income). The second column indicates change associated with moving from the lowest to the 
highest value (i.e., 0-8 for household income).  
25
 See Table 7 on page 42 for the change in probabilities associated with the statistically significant variables, as 
well as for the full results of the ANES vote choice model (Table 6). 
26
 A variable measuring moral traditionalism substituted in place of the variable for Protestants also shows 
significance for Bush in an alternate specification. However, neither the dummy variable for gay-marriage states nor 
an interaction measuring moral traditionalism and residence in a gay-marriage state is significant for Bush. 
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 TABLE 6. FACTORS AFFECTING PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE (ANES)27 
Variables Coefficients 
   
Protestant 0.7639** 
Catholic 0.0874 
Gay-marriage state 0.5691 
Protestant * gay-marriage state 
-0.8256 
Party identification 2.4739*** 
Education 
-0.1627** 
Household income 0.0053 
Black 
-1.5001*** 
Hispanic 
-0.4639 
Marital status 0.1764 
Sex 
-0.0676 
Age 0.0960** 
Age-squared 0.0009** 
Constant 
-4.4212*** 
   
N = 713 * indicates p < .10 
 ** indicates p < .05 
Pseudo r-squared = 0.4736 *** indicates p < .01 
 
 TABLE 7. CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED  
         VOTE CHOICE (ANES RESULTS)28 
 
 
Variables 0-> 1 Min-> Max 
      
Protestant 0.1882 0.1882 
Party identification 0.4027 0.8439 
Education -0.0371 -0.2392 
Black -0.3311 -0.3311 
Age 0.001 0.9305 
Age-squared -0.0001 -0.8696 
 
                                                 
27
 Dependent variable in Table 6 is presidential vote choice (0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush).  
28
 The first column of coefficient values in Table 7 indicates the change in probability associated with increasing in 
one value on the variable scale (i.e., moving from 2 to 3 on the scale for the education variable). The second column 
of coefficient values indicates the change in probability associated with moving from the lowest value of the 
variable to the highest value (i.e., 0 to 8 on the scale for the education variable).  
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by over 84 percentage points. This is nearly identical to the 84.56 figure produced in the NAES 
model. As is the case with the NAES model, the relationship between the two variables is 
significant at the .01 level, and in both vote choice models, the coefficient for party identification 
is larger than that of any other independent variable.  
 Unlike the NAES model, though, the ANES vote choice model shows that more educated 
voters were less likely to have cast a ballot for Bush than less educated voters. Moving from a 
voter who did not have a high school diploma to one who had attained an advanced degree 
decreased the likelihood of his or her voting for Bush by nearly 24 percentage points. The 
coefficient for the education variable in the NAES model, while negative, is not related to vote 
choice in 2004.  
 Black voters were only 33 percentage points less likely to have cast a ballot for Bush in 
2004 than white voters and other racial minorities, according to the ANES finding. The 
curvilinear effect that’s been found to exist between age and turnout, oddly, exists between age 
and vote choice in 2004. The likelihood of voting for Bush in 2004 increased with age, but only 
up to a certain point.  
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DISCUSSION 
 It is difficult to conclude with any amount of certainty that the independent variables of 
interest in this design were influential in terms of predicting turnout in 2004. The stronger NAES 
intention to vote models show that identification as a born-again/evangelical Protestant is 
substantively, weakly related to intention to vote in 2004. A possible explanation for the 
statistical discrepancy between the NAES and ANES models is that the variable substituted in 
place of born-again Protestant in the ANES dataset does not reduce the measure down to those 
who identified as a born-again or evangelical Christian, and is thus much cruder. It could be that 
the NAES model accurately predicted turnout among born-again Protestants in November. Or, it 
could be that these voters overreported their likelihood of voting, as they have been found to do 
retrospectively. Unfortunately, the findings from the models do not lend one to draw a strong 
conclusion in this regard. 
  Similarly, the ANES turnout model failed to substantiate the finding that potential voters 
residing in states with a marriage amendment on the ballot were more likely to have voted in 
November. Results from the NAES also show a substantively weak relationship between 
residence in a marriage state and intention to vote, in that this independent variable is not related 
to intention to vote among any of the parties, but is only related to the dependent variable when 
all voters are included together. In the ANES model, the relationship between the two variables 
is not statistically significant. Once again, though, the available data made it such that the 
variable used for gay-marriage states in the ANES models is a crude measure of the actual voter 
universe. The data does not contain responses from essentially half (5 of 11) of the states that 
voted on a marriage amendment, meaning again, that it is difficult to conclude with any amount 
of certainty how turnout in 2004 was affected as a function of residence in a marriage state.  
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 Born-again/evangelicals may or may not have been more likely than other groups to turn 
out in 2004, but the findings show that the president did benefit from their presence at the polls. 
Both vote choice models show that the relationship between this variable and support for Bush is 
highly related. There is no evidence, however, that evangelicals who lived in marriage states 
were more likely than evangelicals who lived in the other 39 states to have voted for the 
president in 2004—or that any voters living in marriage states were more likely than those living 
outside them to vote to re-elect Bush in 2004. To the extent that the marriage issue itself 
influenced the presidential contest, results from the NAES show only that voters who held a very 
conservative position on gay-marriage were very likely to vote for Bush in 2004, everything else 
equal.  
 Taken together, the independent variables of interest in this design show that the effects 
of direct democracy, and perhaps the marriage campaigns themselves, impacted the 2004 
presidential election in a minimal way. Ultimately, it appears that it is still the characteristics of 
the individual voter (race, education, sex, etc.) that can best predict turnout, rather than the 
activities of the campaigns, which would seem to lend support to a minimal campaign effects 
thesis.  
 This design corroborates other findings on the 2004 U.S. presidential election in two 
ways: 1) that certain voters living in marriage amendment states were not more likely than 
residents living outside them to have voted in 2004. And, 2) that voters in these states were not 
more likely to have voted for Bush in 2004, everything else equal. Rather, the influence of 
evangelicals on vote choice is consistent across the states. It is necessary to note that the 
measures of the dependent variables in the NAES (and the ANES) models are not perfect, or 
even ideal. But, there is reason to believe that they are reliable measures of turnout and vote 
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choice, such that it’s possible to extrapolate findings from the models to enhance a greater 
understanding of the factors that influenced the 2004 presidential election—and turnout and vote 
choice more broadly.   
 A benefit of including the turnout model using the ANES data is that it seems to confirm 
the factors that did in fact predict turnout in 2004. Women, strong conservatives, highly-educated 
voters, and voters living in higher-income households all were not only likely to express an 
intention to vote prior to the election when asked, but were also likely to follow through and vote 
in November. In this sense, then, the NAES intention to vote models appear to resemble valid 
turnout models for a partisan election. Controls for such factors as party identification strength, 
age, and the South—factors that have been found to be related to turnout in past studies—are 
statistically significant (in the expected directions) in the NAES intention to vote models and the 
ANES turnout model. 
 One area, though, where the NAES models more closely resemble a typical model for 
overreporting is in the finding for the control for potential black voters. The NAES models show 
a strong positive relationship between race (black) and intention to vote; the ANES model, 
however, shows that blacks were not more likely than whites or other racial minorities to have 
turned out in 2004. If anything, blacks have usually been found to turn out at lower rates than 
whites. If blacks are the group most likely to have overreported voting in 2004, that the ANES 
model indicates they were not more likely than other groups to turn out in 2004 seems to confirm 
my interpretation that this earlier positive effect is a function of overreporting.  
    One area where the ANES findings may be superior to the NAES findings is in the 
estimated relationships between turnout and battleground states. The ANES shows that 
respondents living in battleground states were more likely than those living outside them to have 
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voted in 2004; this finding is consistent with the general one in the literature, and seems to be the 
most plausible one for this variable. It seems likely that there may have been more pressure for 
residents in battleground states to vote in November, but not necessarily more pressure for them 
to indicate an intention to vote prior to the election. It could be that the overinflated dependent 
variable in the NAES models made it such that the results are skewed in terms of showing 
inflated turnout as a function of residence in a non-battleground state. 
 Despite the relative small number of observations in the vote choice models, the findings 
generally agree with each other. The most significant difference is with the education variables. 
Although the variable is negatively signed in the NAES model, the relationship is not significant, 
unlike in the ANES model—where the most highly-educated voters were 24 percentage points 
less likely to have voted for Bush than voters with the least amount of formal education, 
everything else equal. The income brackets the interviewers placed the respondents in for this 
question differed somewhat, but not enough to mean the difference between a negative 
relationship and a statistically insignificant one, one would think.  
 It could be that excluding the control for ideology in the ANES model made it such that a 
relationship between education and vote choice is detected—when none truly exists. 
Additionally, the lower number of observations in the ANES model and the lower pseudo r-
squared value may mean that the null finding for education in the NAES model is more accurate 
than the negative relationship the ANES model detected. 
 A control for ideology as well as a measure of respondents’ positions on the gay-marriage 
issue was excluded in the ANES vote choice model for the purpose of keeping the number of 
observations in the model higher than a minimum number of 700 respondents. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The closeness of the 2004 presidential election, the unique role values voters and gay-
marriage played in the campaign, and the contradictory findings on how the marriage issue 
substantively affected turnout and vote choice among evangelical Christians combined to present 
an opportunity to re-examine how these factors influenced the 2004 presidential election. 
 I developed a research design that built on a similar one Campbell and Monson (2008) 
constructed, to gain a better understanding of the role evangelicals and the gay-marriage issue 
played in the 2004 presidential election. The scholars’ conclusion is clear in that they determined 
that (white) evangelicals living in gay-marriage amendment states were more likely than other 
evangelicals to vote for President Bush in 2004, but ambiguous in that it combines the effect of 
this interaction on both turnout and vote choice. Using a large and previously untapped dataset, I 
find that identification as an evangelical is not related to turnout, but that it is significantly 
related to vote choice. Everything else equal, born-again Protestants were more than 25 
percentage points more likely than non-born-again Protestants to have voted for Bush in 2004.  
 The effects of the marriage amendments in the 2004 election, though, appear to be 
minimal, if not nonexistent. Turnout in gay-marriage states was not higher among evangelicals, 
or among the electorate at-large than it was in the states whose voters did not cast a ballot on a 
marriage amendment. It could be that the initiatives primed voters to consider the issue when 
they cast their ballot for president, and that this effect may have been significant for Bush. But, 
the findings in this design show that initiatives in the context of the 2004 election did not have a 
substantive impact on the outcome. Evangelicals did increase the president’s vote share, but this 
effect is consistent across the states, and not confined to marriage amendment states.  
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 Turnout in 2004 can be better explained by traditional factors that have been found to 
have a positive effect—strength of party identification, education, income, age, region, residence 
in a battleground state, etc. Similarly, characteristics such as party identification, ideology, and 
race accurately predicted vote choice in 2004. Campaign strategists, then, should take notice that 
the effects of short-term and temporal factors like hot-button issues and forms of direct 
democracy are limited in the amount of influence they can have in the context of a U.S. 
presidential election. These political actors are probably better served by focusing on the relevant 
characteristics of their respective electoral bases, and then devising a strategy with those factors 
given top priority.  
 Comparing the influence of evangelical Christians across elections is a potential avenue 
for future research. How did evangelicals factor into the 2000 U.S. presidential contest, in terms 
of both turnout and vote choice, when former President Bush was on the presidential ballot for 
the first time, and when gay-marriage is said to have played no meaningful role in the campaign? 
 Another possible avenue for research entails comparing findings across years, as a 
function of the type of election (on-year-off-year, presidential-midterm, etc.). Is turnout among 
evangelicals more pronounced in midterm elections—when ballot initiatives perhaps have more 
potential to stimulate turnout among the larger electorate? How did participation among 
evangelicals in the 2006 midterm election fare as a function of the presence of social issue ballot 
measures, in comparison to their participation in the 2004 election?    
  Additionally, how did turnout in marriage states in 2004 compare to turnout in those 
same states in the 2000 presidential election—when marriage amendments were not on the 
November ballot? It could be that a better way to gauge the effects of the marriage amendments 
on turnout is to compare results across elections, rather than across states. 
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APPENDICES 
NAES VARIABLE CODINGS 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Intend to vote in general election: 
  0 = no; 1 = yes; (question asked 7/16/2004 – 9/22/2004 without filter; question  
  asked 9/23/2004 – 11/1/2004 with filter “if did not vote early in general election”)  
 
Presidential vote choice: 
  0 = Kerry, Nader, or someone else; 1 = Bush; (question asked 9/23/2004 –  
  11/1/2004 and 11/3/2004 – 11/16/2004) 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Born-again Protestant: 
0 = respondents who attend religious services and who identify as: non-Protestant 
and not an evangelical/born-again Christian, non-Protestant and evangelical/born-
again Christian, or Protestant and not evangelical/born-again Christian; 1 = 
respondents who attend Protestant services (to include: Baptist, Christian, 
Episcopal, Jehovah’s Witness, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and non-
denominational Christian) and identify themselves as evangelical/born-again 
Christians. 
 
Gay-marriage state: 
  0 = each of the 39 states without marriage amendment on ballot in November, and 
  Washington DC; 1 = Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, 
  Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah 
 
Born-again Protestant × gay-marriage state:  
  Effect of born-again Protestantism and living in one of 11 states with marriage  
  amendment on the November ballot 
 
Battleground states:  
0 = each of the 39 states whose electoral votes were decided by more than five 
percentage points in the general election; 1 = Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin (states whose electoral votes were decided by fewer than five 
percentage points in the general election) 
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Marriage amendment:  
  0 = respondents who would strongly oppose an amendment to the U.S.   
  Constitution forbidding states to marry same-sex couples; 1 =    
  “…somewhat oppose…”; 2 = “…neither approve nor oppose…”; 3 =   
  “…somewhat approve…”; 4 = “…strongly approve…” (question asked from  
  2/5/2004 – 11/16/2004) 
 
 
Party identification strength: 
0 = not strong; 1 = strong (question asked to interviewees: Do you consider 
yourself a strong or not a very strong Republican/Democrat/Independent?) 
 
Party identification:  
  0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; 2 = Republicans 
 
Conservatism: 
  0 = very liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = moderate; 3 = conservative; 4 = very conservative 
 
Ideology strength: 
  0 = moderate; 1 = conservative and liberal; 2 = very conservative and very liberal 
 
Education: 
  0 = eighth grade or lower; 1 = some high school, but no diploma; 2 = high school  
  diploma or equivalent; 3 = technical or vocational school after high school; 4 =  
  some college, but no degree; 5 = Associate’s degree or two-year college degree; 6 
  = four-year college degree; 7 = graduate or professional school, but no degree; 8 =  
  graduate or professional degree 
 
Household income: 
  0 = less than $10,000; 1 = $10,000 - $15,000; 2 = $15,000 - $25,000; 3 = $25,000  
  - $35,000; 4 = $35,000 - $50,000; 5 = $50,000 - $75,000; 6 = $75,000 - $100,000;  
  7 = $100,000 - $150,000; 8 = More than $150,000 
 
Age:   
  Variable not recoded; functions as continuous variable (respondents in NAES  
  dataset range from 18 to 97 years of age) 
 
Sex: 
  0 = male; 1 = female 
 
Black: 
0 = white, Asian, American Indian, other; 1 = black (question asked of 
respondents who indicated in previous survey question that they were not of 
Hispanic or Latino descent)  
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Hispanic: 
0 = not Hispanic; 1 = Hispanic (question asked to interviewees: Are you of 
Hispanic or Latino descent?) 
 
Marital status:  
  0 = never married, separated, divorced, widowed, or living as married; 1 =  
  married 
 
South:  
0 = each of the 39 states not of the Old Confederacy, and Washington D.C.; 1 = 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia  
 
Catholic:  
0 = Protestants (to include: Baptist, Christian, Episcopal, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and non-denominational Christian), Jews, 
Mormons, Orthodox (to include: Greek, Russian, and Eastern), Muslims, other; 1 
= Catholics (question asked to interviewees: Do you mostly attend a place of 
worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, an Orthodox 
Church, Muslim, or some other religion?) 
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ANES VARIABLE CODINGS 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Voted in 2004 general election: 
  0 = no; 1 = yes 
 
Presidential vote choice: 
  0 = Kerry, Nader, someone else; 1 = Bush 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Protestant:  
  0 = Catholic, Eastern Orthodox (Christian), Jewish, other, none; 1 = Protestant 
 
Gay-marriage state: 
  0 = each of the 39 states without marriage amendment on ballot in November, and 
  Washington DC; 1 = Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, 
  Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah (data contains  
  missing responses from Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota,   
  and Oklahoma)   
 
Protestant × gay-marriage state interaction: 
  Measures effect of identification as Protestant and residence in one of 11 states  
  with marriage amendment on the November ballot 
 
Battleground states: 
0 = each of the 39 states whose electoral votes were decided by more than five 
percentage points in the general election; 1 = states whose electoral votes were 
decided by fewer than five percentage points: Colorado, Iowa, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin (data contains missing responses from Nevada and New Mexico) 
 
Party identification: 
  0 = Democrats; 1 = Independents; 2 = Republicans 
 
Conservatism:  
  0 = extremely liberal; 1 = liberal; 2 = slightly liberal; 3 = moderate; 4 = slightly  
  conservative; 5 = conservative; 6 = extremely conservative     
 
Education: 
  0 = no high school diploma; 1 = eight grades or less completed, no diploma; 2 =  
  nine to eleven grades completed, no diploma; 3 = high school diploma or   
  equivalent; 4 = more than 12 years of schooling completed, no college degree; 5 = 
  junior college or community college degree; 6 = Bachelor of Arts degree, no  
  advanced degree; 7 = advanced degree attained 
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Household income: 
  0 = less than $9,000 annually; 1 = $9,000 - $14,999 annually; 2 = $15,000 -  
  $24,999 annually; 3 = $25,000 - $34,999 annually; 4 = $35,000 - $49,999   
  annually; 5 = $50,000 - $69,999 annually; 6 = $70,000 - $89,999 annually; 7 =  
  $90,000 - $119,999 annually; 8 = $120,000 annually or more 
 
Age:  
  Variable not recoded; functions as continuous variable (respondents in ANES  
  dataset range from 18 to 90 years of age) 
 
Sex:  
  0 = male; 1 = female 
 
Black:  
  0 = else (Asian, Native American, Hispanic, etc.); 1 = black 
 
Hispanic: 
  0 = else (black, Asian, Asian and Native American, etc.); 1 = Hispanic (black and  
  Hispanic, Hispanic, Hispanic and white) 
 
Marital status: 
  0 = widowed, divorced, not married, separated, never married, or partnered; 1 =  
  married 
South:  
0 = each of the 39 states not of the Old Confederacy, and Washington D.C.; 1 = 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia (data contains missing responses from 
Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina) 
 
Catholic: 
  0 = Protestant, Eastern Orthodox (Christian), Jewish, other, none; 1 = Catholic 
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